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Climate Change and the Regional Human
Rights Systems
by Megan S. Chapman*

I

n last year’s Climate Law Reporter, Staff Writer Anne Parsons laid out the fundamental case for using a human rights
framework to shift the burden for protecting individuals from
the negative impacts of climate change to the state.1 The impetus
for that piece was the UN Human Rights Commission’s adoption
of Resolution 7/23.2 In the last year, with the flurry of preparation
for the December 2009 round of UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change negotiations in Copenhagen (“UNFCCC COP15”), a number of institutions have joined the call for developing
the nexus between human rights and climate change.3 The nexus
is meaningful because demonstrating climate change’s numerous
negative impacts on human rights, particularly for already vulnerable populations, is a way of measuring the harm.4 It is also meaningful because it connects this harm to obligations which the state
has already undertaken.5 Thus, it reveals the potential for using
developing supranational human rights legal systems to impose
a duty on states to prevent further climate change and protect
individuals from its negative impacts.6 This piece aims to briefly
explore this latter angle on the human rights-climate change nexus:
the likelihood that international human rights bodies, particularly
the regional human rights systems, will in the foreseeable future
hold states accountable for climate change.
International environmental law and climate change negotiations tend to be based on notions of state-to-state consensus and
cooperation.7 However, there is nothing like the build-up of hopes
and ultimate disappointment of the most recent UNFCCC COP15 negotiations8 to leave individuals wishing for some club to
hold over the heads of states. Aside from democratic processes or
domestic legal remedies, where they exist, regional human rights
systems may offer the best forum for individuals to confront states
that fail to come to consensus or otherwise take steps to combat
climate change.
This is not to say that regional human rights systems have
been perfected. The European Court of Human Rights, the InterAmerican Court of and Commission on Human Rights, and the
African Commission on and newly operational Court of Human
and Peoples’ Rights each face their own challenges: certain states
that accept only limited jurisdiction or no jurisdiction at all;9
absence of regional enforcement mechanisms other than diplomatic or political pressure;10 and consequent reliance on states
for compliance with recommendations and execution of binding
judgments. Nevertheless, each regional system has developed a
mechanism by which individuals may bring complaints against
states for failing to respect, protect, or fulfill regionally guaranteed
human rights.11
In evaluating the potential fate of a petition based on human
rights violations resulting from climate change, each of the three
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established systems has its own strengths. Unlike the foundational documents of the other two systems, the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights actually recognizes a right to environment.12 Moreover, the African Commission on Human and
Peoples Rights (“ACHPR”) has entertained petitions based on violations of this right and found states in violation of their associated
obligations.13 In a resolution on human rights and climate change
issued just prior to COP-15, the ACHPR referenced this “right of
all peoples to an environment favourable to their development”
under the Banjul Charter, along with other international instruments binding of member states of the African Union (“AU”).14
Using this right as a basis, it expressed concern that the COP-15
negotiations would unlikely incorporate human rights considerations and urged the heads of AU member states to ensure that
human rights standards, particularly protections for vulnerable
populations, be included in any climate change agreement resulting from the negotiations.15 The only indication of the ACHPR’s
inclination to hold states accountable for climate change, however,
was in noting that “climate change is principally the result of emissions of greenhouse gases, which remain relatively high in developed countries.”16
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(“IACHR”) is the only of the regional bodies that has squarely
faced a petition based on the human rights consequences of climate
change. In 2005, Sheila Watt-Cloutier of the Inuit Circumpolar
Conference filed a petition with the IACHR on behalf of “all Inuit
of the arctic regions of the United States of America and Canada
who have been affected by the impacts of climate change.”17 The
petition alleged that the United States, the leading greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emitter in the world, is the greatest contributor to climate change, which threatens the enjoyment of numerous human
rights guaranteed by the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man18 to the Inuit living in the arctic regions.19 The specific rights identified include their rights “to the benefits of culture,
to property, to the preservation of health, life, physical integrity,
security, and a means of subsistence, and to residence, movement,
and inviolability of the home.”20 The petitioners argued that U.S.
government should be held accountable for these violations to the
extent that they result from both its acts—enabling or contributing
disproportionately to GHG emissions—and its omissions—failing
to take meaningful steps to reduce GHG emissions and otherwise
counteract climate change.21
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This petition faced several notable challenges. First, because
the United States has not accepted the jurisdiction of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, the petition could only be
brought before the IACHR, which may issue recommendations
but not binding judgments.22 Secondly, as would be the case
with any lawsuit relating to responsibility for climate change, it
faced the tremendous burden of proving legally sufficient causation between the harm resulting from climate change and the acts
and omissions of the U.S. government. The petition did an admirable job of laying out the scientific evidence for the connection
between GHG emissions and climate change, the U.S. contribution to GHG emissions, the effects of climate change on the arctic
environment, and the complete dependence of Inuit peoples on the
arctic environment.23
Despite these efforts, the IACHR dismissed the petition without prejudice on November 16, 2006.24 Nevertheless, the IACHR
did invite the petitioners, along with the Center for International
Environmental Law (“CIEL”) and Earthjustice to a thematic
hearing on the issue of global warming and human rights in the
Americas on March 1, 2007.25 This hearing offers perhaps the
best indication of the challenges that future litigation over human
rights violations as consequence of climate change will face before
a regional human rights body. The questions from three commissioners addressed (1) how to attribute or divide responsibility
among states in the region or even states that are not members
of the OAS;26 (2) how the rights violations suffered by the Inuit
could be tied more closely to concrete acts or omissions of specific states;27 (3) whether the petitioners had exhausted domestic
remedies, a requirement for admissibility in any of the regional
human rights systems;28 and (4) what examples of good practices undertaken by states could guide the Commission in making
recommendations.29
Counsel for the three organizations responded to each of the
questions deftly. To the first, they explained the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility,” as a key component of state
responsibility under international economic law.30 To the third, the
question of exhaustion of domestic remedies, they explained why
there is no comparable legal remedy available in the United States
or Canada that would require the government to pay compensation
for human rights violations associated with climate change.31 To
the fourth question, counsel from CIEL pointed to good practices
to counteract global warming in several states in the Americas,
particularly Brazil.32

The second question, as articulated by Commissioner Victor
Abromovich, seemed to remain most unresolved at the end of the
hearing:
Is there a precise form in which the impact you have
described very well on fundamental rights can be tied
to the actions or omissions of the particular states? . . .
[I]n all cases . . . considered by the Inter-American system, there have existed direct actions . . . or the failure
to act by the state in the face of a concrete situation, for
example . . . forestry in an indigenous territory. Now,
the problem you are laying out, without doubt, links to
state and non-state actors, but the relationship is much
. . . less direct. So, I would like clarification about how
there can be a relationship—not just any relationship, a
legal relationship, a relationship of responsibility—of
the states for violations of the rights that you have very
clearly described.33
This causal connection question presents the greatest gap
between precedent cases on environmental damage that have been
accepted by the regional human rights bodies and the issue of
climate change and resulting human rights violations. Like other
current frontiers in regional human rights law, resolution of this
question might require either meeting a nearly impossible quantum of proof or bringing a petition against several or all states in
a region.
One possible way forward may lie in the approach taken by the
European Court on Human Rights (“ECtHR”) in a series of precedents recently identified in a Council of Europe (CoE) report on
climate change and human rights. Although the European (Rome)
Convention on Human Rights does not affirmatively guarantee a
right to the environment,34 the ECtHR has held states accountable
for human rights violations resulting from environmental damage in a number of cases.35 Most often, these cases hold the state
accountable for failure to protect individuals from actions of third
parties, often corporations, and tie the environmental damage to
violations of Article 8 (right to family and private life), Article
2 (right to life), and Article 1 (right to property), although other
rights have also been implicated.36 As the CoE report pointed out,
these cases demonstrate a state’s positive obligation where “inaction would exacerbate [a threat to human rights]” of which the
state is aware.37 This obligation could also attach in the climate
change context, even though the causal connection between GHG
emissions and human rights may be difficult to prove.38
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See IPCC Reference Document, supra note 24, at 11.
See SCES–Group, spol. s r. o., Dokumentace Záměru Komplexní Obnova
Elektrárny Prunéřov II 3 × 250 MWe dle Zákona č. 100/2001 Sb., v Platném
Znění, 11, 13 (Dec. 2008), available at http://tomcat.cenia.cz/eia/download.
jsp?view=eia_cr&id=MZP221&file=dokumentaceDOC (based on a translated
version).
27 See Letter from Andrew Yatilman, supra note 3, at 2.
28 The BREF BAT range for thermal efficiency of an existing pulverized combustion (“PC”) lignite plant ranges from 36%-40% or an incremental improvement of more than 3%. The current efficiency level of Prunéřov II lignite plant
is 33%. See supra, note 24, at 269; Press Release, Jan Dusík, M.Sc., First
Deputy Minister and Dir. of the Foreign, Legislative and State Admin. Section,
Czech Ministry of the Env’t, Ministerstvo Životního Prostředí Nechá Posoudit
Obnovu Uhelné Plektrárny Prunéřov Nezávislým Mezinárodním Týmem
(Jan. 26, 2010), available at http://www.mzp.cz/cz/news_tz100126prunerov_
posouzeni_brifink (translation unavailable).
29 See Letter from Andrew Yatilman, supra note 3, at 2; Press Release,
Ladislav Kriz, supra note 1.
30 See IPCC Reference Document, supra note 24, at 269.
31 See Letter from Andrew Yatilman, supra note 4, at 2.
32 See Press Release, Jan Dusík, supra note 29; see also Michael Kahn & Jan
Korselt, Micronesia Leads Czechs to Seek Power Plant Review, Reuters (Jan.
26, 2010), http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE60P2C520100126.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See generally Press Release, Jan Dusík, supra note 29; see also Michael
Kahn, supra note 29. But see Letter from Andrew Yatilman, supra note 4, at 1.
36 On February 9, 2010, the Czech Environmental Minister Jan Dusík,
announced that the ministry selected Norwegian firm DNV to review the
planned expansion of the Prunéřov II plant. DNV will review: (1) the BAT as
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detailed in the BREF for large combustion sources and energy efficiency; (2)
the EIA process as it pertains to completeness, accuracy, and transparency; and
(3) calculate and evaluate the difference in CO2 emissions from the proposed
plant and the plant conforming to the higher BAT level. The finalization of the
EIA final opinion will use DNV’s report, expected in mid March of 2010, as an
advisory document. See Press Release, Jan Dusík, M.Sc., First Deputy Minister
and Dir. of the Foreign, Legislative and State Admin. Section, Czech Ministry
of the Env’t, Mezinárodní Posouzení Záměru,Komplexní Obnova Elektrárny
Prunéřov 3 x 250 MWe“ Zpracuje Konzultační Firma DNV (based on a translated version) (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.mzp.cz/cz/news_100208_prunerov;
see also Jason Hovet, Czechs tap Norwegian firm for coal plant, Reuters
(Feb. 9, 2010) http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE6181UV20100209. On
March 18, 2010, the Czech Environmental Minister Jan Duskin resigned after
Prime Minister Jan Fischer put pressure on him to approve state-owned CEZ’s
planned expansion of the Prunéřov II plant. Duskin referenced DNV’s report
indicating CEZ’s renovation would not use best available technology (“BAT”)
and thus refused to approve the project. “I am not convinced that it is possible
to give a positive or negative opinion with a clear conscience now, with regards
to the situation in which the EIA (“Environmental Impact Assessment”) process is presently in,” Dusik said. “That’s why I decided to resign.” See Press
Release, Jan Dusík, M.Sc., First Deputy Minister and Dir. of the Foreign,
Legislative and State Admin. Section, Czech Ministry of the Env’t, Elektrárna
Prunéřov: Ministr Dusík Odchází Z Vlády (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.mzp.cz/
cz/news_TZ_100318; see also Press Release Tisková Zpráva A Studie DNV K
Záměru Obnovy Uhelné Elektrárny Prunéřov (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.mzp.
cz/cz/news_TZ_100318_DNV; Czech Enviro Minister Resigns Over Power
Plant, Business Week (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/
financialnews/D9EH85O80.htm; Jason Hovet, Czech Minister Quits Over Controversial Power Plant, Reuters (Mar. 18, 2010), http://uk.reuters.com/article/
idUKLDE62H22D20100318.
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In response to Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23, the Office of the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights conducted a detailed analytical study,
inviting submissions from states, intergovernmental and nongovernmental
organizations, national human rights organizations, and other experts, on the
implications of climate change for the enjoyment of human rights. The results
were submitted with its annual report to the Human Rights Council, with Part
II using this means of measuring of consequences. See Report of the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Relationship
between Climate Change and Human Rights, A/HRC/10/61, Jan. 15, 2009, pt.
II.
5 See, e.g. id. pt. III (detailing the relevant national and international human
rights obligations of states).
6 Parallel Workshop on Climate Change and Human Rights, Presented at
the 2009 Global Humanitarian Forum Geneva on Human Impact of Climate
Change, June 23-24, 2009, available at http://www.ghf-ge.org/Portals/0/pdfs/
climate_change_and_human_rights_wk.pdf (identifying individual petitions
before the regional human rights systems as one of four avenues for legal
recourse using human rights law).
7 Council of Europe, supra note 3, at 4 (describing international environmental
law as “a law of co-operation, in which States undertake commitments to support each other[] to address global concerns”).
8 Despite positive developments in laying the groundwork for future negotiations, UNFCCC COP-15 failed to result in a comprehensive agreement on
climate change. Video: Press Briefing by UNFCCC Executive Secretary Yves
de Boer on the Outcome of Copenhagen and the Way Forward in 2010, Jan. 20,
2010, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lgNkkBHlZqg&feature=
player_embedded (describing Copenhagen as “not a complete success”).
9 For example, the United States has not ratified the American Convention on
Human Rights and does not accept the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights.
10 In each system, the enforcement of judgments relies on the political weight
and moral authority of the Council of Europe, the Organization of American
States (“OAS”), and the African Union. Whereas the European system formally
charges the Council of Ministers to enforce judgments of the European Court
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of Human Rights, the role of the OAS in enforcement is not explicit, but rests
on moral weight and political pressure rather than threat of sanctions. See Lea
Shaver, The Inter-American Human Rights System: An Effective Institution
for Regional Human Rights Protection?, 9:4 Washington U. Global L. Stud.
Rev., available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1437633. In the African system,
“blatant disregard” for the recommendations of the African Commission is
more widespread. Fekadeselassie F. Kidanemariam, Enforcement of Human
Rights under Regional Mechanisms: a Comparative Analysis (2006) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, University of Georgia School of Law), available at http://
digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1079&context=stu_
llm (last visited Mar. 3, 2010).
11 See, generally, Kidanemariam, supra note 10.
12 Cross-referencing Article 22, which articulates a people’s collective right
to economic, social, and cultural development, Article 24 of the Charter
enshrines a people’s “right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to
their development.” African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
adopted June 27, 1981, arts. 22, 24, available at http://www.africa-union.org/
official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/Banjul%20Charter.pdf.
13 See, e.g., The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for
Economic and Social Rights / Nigeria, Comm. No. 155/96, Decision ACHPR/
COMM/A044/1 ¶ 52 (2002) (stating that Article 24 of the Banjul Charter
“imposes clear obligations upon a government . . . to take reasonable and other
measures to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, to promote conservation, and to secure an ecologically sustainable development and use of natural
resources”), available at http://www.cesr.org/downloads/AfricanCommissionDecision.pdf.
14 ACHPR Resolution, supra note 3.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking
Relief from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and
Omissions of the United States, Dec. 7, 2005 [hereinafter Inuit Circumpolar
Petition], available at http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/files/uploads/icc-files/
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FINALPetitionICC.pdf.
18 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Adopted by the 9th
International Conference of American States, Bogota, Colombia, 1948, available at http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic2.American%20Declaration.
htm. Although the American Declaration was originally adopted as a declaration rather than a binding instrument, both the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have interpreted
it as a source of international obligations for members of the Organization of
American States. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Introduction,
http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/Basic1.%20Intro.htm#_ftnref5 (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
19 Inuit Circumpolar Petition, supra note 9, at 1-9.
20 Id. at 5 (noting that the rights violated arise either from the American Declaration or other international human treaties binding on the United States).
21 Id. at 103-110.
22 Shaver, supra note 10.
23 Inuit Circumpolar Petition, supra note 9, at 13-69.
24 Center for International Environmental Law, The Inuit Case, http://www.
ciel.org/Climate/Climate_Inuit.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
25 Letter from the IACHR to representatives of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, EarthJustice, and CIEL, Ref: Global Warming and Human Rights, Hearing – 127th Ordinary Period of Sessions, Feb. 1, 2007, available at http://www.
ciel.org/Publications/IACHR_Response_1Feb07.pdf.
26 Video: General Hearing on Global Warming and Human Rights, IACHR
127th Ordinary Period of Sessions, Mar. 1, 2007 [hereinafter Hearing], available at http://www.oas.org/OASpage/videosasf/2007/03/CIDH_1.wmv (question of Commissioner Paulo Sergio Pinheiro).
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Id. (question of Commissioner Victor Abromovich) (author’s translation).
Id. (question of Commissioner Santiago Canton).
29 Id. (question of Commissioner Paulo Sergio Pinheiro).
30 Id. (response of Martin Wagner, Earthjustice Managing Attorney).
31 Attorney Martin Wagner discussed the then-pending case, Massachusetts
v. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 49 U.S. 497 (2007), in which the
U.S. Supreme Court determined that GHGs constitute air pollutants covered
by the Clean Air Act and therefore subject to regulation by the EPA. But, as
he pointed out, the Clean Air Act does not offer a mechanism for individuals
to obtain compensation for violations resulting from government failure to
regulate, because under U.S. tort law, a tort claim can only be brought if the
government waives its sovereign immunity, which is highly unlikely. Moreover, Wagner pointed out that the rights at issue in this case, such as the right to
culture, are not guaranteed in the U.S. constitution or U.S. law. Id. (response of
Martin Wagner, Earthjustice Managing Attorney). Paul Crowley, the Canadian
attorney for Sheila Watt-Cloutier, noted that similar barriers to legal recourse
exist in Canada. Id. (response of Paul Crowley).
32 Hearing, supra note 26 (response of Donald Goldberg, CIEL Senior Attorney).
33 Id. (question of Commissioner Victor Abromovich) (author’s translation).
34 Council of Europe, supra note 3, at 11.
35 Id. at 12.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 13.
38 Council of Europe, supra note 3.
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Endnotes: Industry Cries Foul to EPA’s Attempt to Regulate GHG Emissions Using the Clean Air Act
continued from page 42
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See Notice of Issuance of the Administrator’s Interpretation, 73 Fed. Reg.
80,300 (Dec. 31, 2008); Memorandum from Stephen L. Johnson, Administrator of EPA, to Regional Administrators of EPA (Dec. 18, 2008), [hereinafter
Memorandum], available at http://www.epa.gov/nsr/documents/psd_interpretive_memo_12.18.08.pdf (proposing and financing its endangerment finding
and advocating an interpretation of “subject to regulation” that permits public
comment).
7 See generally EPA, New Source Review: Fact Sheet (Sept. 30, 2009), http://
www.epa.gov/NSR/fs20090930action.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Fact Sheet] (summarizing the regulation from the EPA’s perspective).
8 Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007) (stating that EPA “can avoid taking
further action . . . if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot
or will not exercise its discretion,” but “not reach[ing] the question whether on
remand EPA must make an endangerment finding, or whether policy concerns
can inform EPA’s actions in the event that it makes such a finding”).
9 Id. at 535 (emphasis added).
10 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7475(a)(4) (1990). But cf. EPA Protection of
Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(50)(iv) (2010) (using very similar language
to include more regulated pollutants).
11 See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed.
Reg. 44,354 (July 30, 2008).
12 See Memorandum, supra note 6.
13 See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed.
Reg. at 44,354 (explaining that the classification of GHGs individually or as a
class has impacts on the determination of BACT requirements).
14 Proposed Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed.
Reg. 49,454 (Sept. 28, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 86 and 600).
15 See EPA, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases under the Clean Air Act (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (clarifying that though
the finding does not impose new requirements, it is a prerequisite to regulation).
16 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292 (Oct. 27, 2009) [hereinafter PSD and Title V
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GHG Tailoring Rule] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, 52, 70 and 71). See
generally Fact Sheet, supra note 7 (describing the proposal as addressing “large
facilities emitting over 25,000 tons of GHGs a year”).
17 PSD and Title V GHG Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292.
18 Id.
19 See id. (citing Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
20 Id.
21 See, e.g., National Association of Manufacturers, National Association of
Manufacturers’ Form Comment Page, http://namissvr.nam.org/minisites/EPA/
index.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2010) (encouraging comment on the EPA’s tailoring rule from the perspective of the manufacturer).
22 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 144-45 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-172, at
96-97 (1977) (“Such a [permitting] process is reasonable and necessary for very
large sources, such as new electrical generating plants or new steel mills. But
the procedure would prove costly and potentially unreasonable if imposed on
construction of storage facilities for a small gasoline jobber or on the construction of a new heating plant at a junior college, each of which may have the
potential to emit 100 tons of pollution annually.”). See also Ala. Power Co., 636
F.2d at 353-54 (stating that Congress’s “intention [in passing the CAA] was to
identify facilities which, due to their size, are financially able to bear the substantial regulatory costs imposed by the PSD provisions and which, as a group, are
primarily responsible for emission of the deleterious pollutants that befoul our
nation’s air. . . . [A] further look at the legislative history reveal[s] that Congress
was concerned with large industrial enterprises—major actual emitters of air
pollution. The draftsmen were of the view that certain small industrial facilities
within these categories might actually and potentially emit less than the threshold amount.”). Id.
23 But see MIT, The Future of Coal (2007), available at http://web.mit.edu/
coal/The_Future_of_Coal.pdf. The cost of carbon sequestration is about $30/ton
of CO2, although the estimate is uncertain. See id. at 91.
24 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 94-717, at 23 (1976) (noting that Congress did not
intend to simply create delays or impair economic growth). See Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7470 (1990) (The PSD program was intended ‘‘to insure that economic growth will occur in a manner consistent with the preservation of existing
clear air resources.”); H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 154 (1977) (legislation “not only
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